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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ONCE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S PRESENT INSANITY APPEARS, TRIAL JUDGE MUST
ORDER HEARING ON THAT ISSUE, NOTWITHSTANDING EVI-
DENCE TO THE CONTRARY. People v. Pennington (Cal. 1967).
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sen-
tenced to death.' Although the jury found him sane at the time of
the crime,' he made a motion to suspend the trial and conduct a
hearing under Section 1368 of the California Penal Code on the
issue of his present sanity.3 The trial court denied his motion."
On appeal to the California Supreme Court,5 defendant contended
that he had been deprived of due process under the fourteenth
amendment by the trial court's denial of a present sanity hearing.
Held, reversed: An accused has a constitutional right to a hearing
on present sanity if he comes forward with substantial evidence that
he is incapable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against
him or of assisting in his defense because of mental illness. No
matter how persuasive other evidence may be to the contrary, once
substantial evidence appears, a doubt as to the sanity of the defen-
dant exists. People v. Pennington, 66 Adv. Cal. 579, 426 P.2d 942,
58 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1967).
1 CA.. PEN. CODE §§ 187, 188-190 (West 1955).
Defendant was also convicted of felony child stealing of his ten year old victim,
CAL. PEN. CODE § 278 (West 1955); of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child
under age fourteen, CAL. PEN. CODE § 288 (West 1955); and unlawfully furnishing
drugs to a minor, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4234 (West 1962).
Three other charges in the indictment, kidnapping, forcible rape, and rape of an
unconscious female, were dismissed at the trial to avoid double punishment.
2 Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 1026 (West 1956).
3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1367 (West 1956). "A person cannot be tried, adjudged to
punishment, or punished for a public offense while he is insane."
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1368 (West 1956).
If at any time during the pendency of an action and prior to judgement a
doubt arises as to the sanity of the defendant, the court must order the
question as to his sanity to be determined by a trial by the court without a
jury, or with a jury, if a trial by jury is demanded; and, from the time of
such order, all proceedings in the criminal prosecution shall be suspended until
the question of the sanity of the defendant has been determined, and the trial
jury in the criminal prosecution may be discharged, or retained, according to
the discretion of the court until the determination of the issue of insanity
(emphasis added).
4 Before expressing the absence of doubt, the trial judge reviewed the expert testi-
mony of one psychologist who believed the defendant to be presently insane, and four
psychiatrists who concluded that defendant was sane. See People v. Ashley, 59 Cal. 2d
339, 363, 379 P.2d 496, 510, 29 Cal. Rptr. 16, 30 (1963); see also People v. Nicolous,
65 Cal. 2d 866, 883, 425 P.2d 787, 798, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635, 646 (1967).
5 Defendant's appeal to the California Supreme Court was automatic. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1239(b) (West 1956).
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Neither the common law,6 the Constitution,7 nor California by
statute8 allows a person to be tried for a public offense9 while insane.
The insanity contemplated by section 1368 is not the M'Naughton
type of insanity. 1° Rather, it is an insanity tested by appraising the
defendant's present ability to understand the nature and purpose of
the proceedings against him so that he will be able to assist in his
defense in a rational manner.
11
It is generally agreed that the "doubt" found in section 1368 refers
to doubt in the mind of the trial judge,' 2 rather than in the mind
of defense counsel's or a witness.14 A trial judge's denial of a present
sanity hearing under section 1368 is subject to attack on appeal only
where legal doubt existed, or where an abuse of discretion appeared
at the trial level.' 5
Important to the interpretation of section 1368 is the word
"doubt." Definitions of doubt in the context of section 1368 have
created ambiguities and confusion for more than one hundred years. 16
Illustrating this point is a comment from the California Supreme
Court in People v. VesterY'7
Neither statute, legal principle, nor maxim of equity is suggested as
a guide for the determination as to where or under what circum-
stances a doubt may be said to have legally arisen .. .whether its
existence is legally required or demanded from a mere trifling remark
or by a single apparent eccentricity of the defendant; or by opinions
of his intimate acquaintances; or by alienists based upon either few
or many facts... is nowhere directly indicated in the law.' 8
6 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1367, 1368 (West 1956).
9 For standing of an insane person in civil actions, see, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1557
(West 1954) and CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (West 1956).
10 E.g., People v. Brock, 57 Cal. 2d 644, 648-49, 371 P.2d 296, 299, 21 Cal. Rptr.
560, 563 (1962); see also CA.LJIC No. 801 (1958):
Insanity as the word is used in these instructions, means such a diseased and
damaged condition of the mental faculties of a person as to render him
incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his act and of distinguishing
between right and wrong in relation to the act with which he is charged.
11 See, e.g., In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d 666, 335 P.2d 657 (1959); People v. Jensen,
43 Cal. 2d 572, 275 P.2d 25 (1954).




15 E.g., People v. Dailey, 175 Cal. App. 2d 101, 108, 345 P.2d 558, 562 (1959).
16 See generally People v. Ah Ying, 42 Cal. 18 (1871); People v. Farrell, 31 Cal.
576 (1867).
17 135 Cal. App. 223, 26 P.2d 685 (1933).
18 Id. at 224, 26 P.2d at 686.
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In an attempt to resolve these uncertainties, the California Supreme
Court "felt compelled" to reverse Pennington on the basis of the
United States Supreme Court decision of Pate v. RobinsonY? How-
ever, Pennington failed to articulate reasons for reversal based on
Pate.0 With Justice Clark writing for the majority, the Pate Court
had held that the evidence introduced on the defendant's behalf
entitled him to a sanity hearing, there being "no justification for
ignoring the uncontradicted testimony of Robinson's history of pro-
nounced irrational behavior." 21
Although obvious similarities exist,2 2 Pate is distinguishable from
Pennington.3 In Pate four lay witnesses gave lengthy testimony
regarding the defendant's irrational behavior.2 4 In rebuttal the pros-
ecution presented a stipulation from one psychiatrist which stated
that in his opinion the defendant knew the nature of the proceedings
and was able to assist counsel in his defense, when he examined him
two or three months before the trial. 25 According to the Court, this
constituted undisputed testimony on behalf of the defendant.20 In
Pennington one psychologist gave testimony and made an affidavit
regarding the defendant's insanity.2 In rebuttal four court-appointed
19 383 U.S. 375 (1966), reviewed in 16 DE PAUL L. REV. 234 (1966) and
criticized in 12 ViL.L. L. REv. 655 (1967).
Robinson was convicted of murdering his common law wife in 1959 and given a life
sentence. On appeal the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Certiorari was denied by the
United States Supreme Court, People v. Robinson, 22 Ill. 2d 162, 174 N.E.2d 820
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 995 (1962).
After denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, acceptance of the petition was made by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. United States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate, 345 P.2d 691
(7th Cir. 1965). The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the District Court
for a limited hearing on the sanity question. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and thus, the case name, Pate v. Robinson.
For an interesting application of Pate, regarding the competency of a narcotics addict
at the time of trial, see Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
But see ,faez v. United States, 367 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1966), as cited in 45 TuxAs
L. REV. 565, 569 n.26 (1967).
20 66 Adv. Cal. at 582, 588, 426 P.2d at 944, 948, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 376, 380.
21 383 U.S. at 385-86 (emphasis added).
22 Both defendants were convicted of murder and both appealed their convictions on
the basis of a denial of a sanity hearing.
23 66 Adv. Cal. at 592, 426 P.2d at 951, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (Mosk J., dissenting
opinion).
24 383 U.S. at 378 & n.2, 383 & n.5. The witnesses were Robinson's mother,
grandfather, aunt, and a family friend. Only the mother and the aunt testified that in
their opinion Robinson was presently insane. For a description of that testimony, see
United States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 1965).
25 383 U.S. at 385-86.
26 Id. at 386.
27 66 Adv. Cal. at 583, 426 P.2d at 944-45, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77.
Other information was available to the trial judge after the denial of the section
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psychiatrists concluded that the defendant was sane .28 A comparison
of these facts indicates that there was contradictory testimony in
Pennington. To reconcile these two differing factual situations it
seems that the Pennington court changed the uncontradicted testi-
mony standard of Pate to a substantial evidence test. Furthermore,
the phrase "substantial evidence" is nowhere to be found in Pate.
The difference between uncontradicted testimony and substantial
evidence is not merely a matter of semantics. Uncontradicted implies
no opposition whatsoever, or a complete lack of contrary facts and
statements.29 Substantial presents a different criterion; in the Pen-
nington context it must be defined as:
30
[Evidence] ... of ponderable legal significance .. .reasonable in
nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be substantial
proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.31
Since uncontradicted testimony and substantial evidence are not
synonomous, it was no coincidence that Justice Clark restricted him-
self to the use of the phrase "uncontradicted testimony."32 If Pate
were properly interpreted, it would not represent a departure from
past California decisions,33 and there would be no need for Penning-
ton to apply Pate.
The only rule expressed in Pate necessitating application in Pen-
nington is the very broad constitutional proposition that a trial judge's
failure to conduct a hearing on the issue of the defendant's present
incompetence, where it is sufficiently manifest, will result in a denial
1368 hearing in the form of testimony by two psychiatrists. But, the Pennington court
stated:
The diagnosis of [the psychologist who testified before the denial of the
section 1368 hearing] ... was, by itself, substantial evidence which compelled
the court to order a section 1368 hearing. . . .Id. at 590, 426 P.2d at 949,
58 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
28 Id. at 584, 426 P.2d at 946, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
29 See the definition of "contradict" in WEBs ER's THmi NEW INTEMATIONAL
DIcroNARY 495 (3d ed. 1961).
30 Although substantial evidence has been used to indicate a mere preponderance of
evidence, the Pennington court's limitation in regard to the weighing of the evidence
preempts any such definition in the Pennington context. 66 Adv. Cal. at 589, 426 P.2d
at 949, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
31 4 WoRDs AND PHRAsES 14 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
32 On petition for rehearing of Pennington, the Attorney General argued:
We do not believe the Supreme Court envisioned the creation of a "sub-
stantial evidence" test when it decided Pate. If Justice Clark had intended to
broaden the concept of due process to include this principle, he would have
surely employed some language at least synonomous with the concept, and
not restricted himself to the phrase "uncontraverted testimony."
Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing at 5, People v. Pennington, 66 Adv. Cal. 579, 426
P.2d 942, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1967).
33 See, e.g., In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d 666, 674, 335 P.2d 657, 661 (1959); People
v. Vester, 135 Cal. App. 223, 237, 26 P.2d 685, 691 (1933).
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of due process. 4 It is again important to note that the Pate Court
refrains from expressing any view as to what constitutes a sufficient
manifestation of the defendant's insanity other than uncontradicted
testimony that he is presently insane.
The logical conclusion seems to be that Pate does not compel
reversal of Pennington.5 Accordingly, the California Supreme Court
"compelled" reversal of Pennington on its own initiative.
The combination of the Pennington substantial evidence test and
post-Pennington decisions leaves California law in a state of con-
siderable confusion. Relative to this confusion, the following points
may be made.
First, it should be ascertained whether there are one or two tests
used to determine the necessity of a section 1368 hearing in Cali-
fornia. If the trial judge is to apply one test, the substantial evidence
test, all uncontradicted testimony must be ipso facto "substantial
evidence" in order to insure a rapport with the uncontradicted testi-
mony test of the United States Supreme Court. Otherwise, the defen-
dant will be denied the due process guaranteed by the Supreme Court
in Pate because a trial judge might determine that uncontradicted
testimony presented in a particular case was not substantial evidence
in the Pennington context. On the other hand, if the trial judge is to
apply two tests, the substantial evidence test and the uncontradicted
testimony test, the application of the former must be limited to con-
tradictory factual situations while the latter must be limited to un-
contradictory factual situations. It should be noted, however, that the
Pennington court did not differentiate between contradictory and
uncontradictory factual situations.
Second, no matter what test is used, another problem arises. If one
witness testifies as to the defendant's insanity and the prosecution
offers no rebuttal, a section 1368 hearing is required as a matter of
constitutional right.3 But, if the prosecution offers any rebuttal at all,
the trial judge must determine without reference to the weight of the
prosecution's evidence whether the evidence presented on behalf of
34 383 U.S. at 385, 387. Accord, Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956),
reversing 223 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
35 But see 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881). Interesting in this respect
is a statement made by Justice Holmes encompassing one of the many ideas which
came in time to be known as the jurisprudential theory of American Legal Realism.
"The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the
actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong." Id.
36 383 U.S. 375.
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the defendant is substantial.37 The very same quality of evidence
offered by the defendant would be substantial in an uncontradictory
factual situation, but not necessarily in one which was contradictory.
Third, Pennington may indicate a trend toward treating medical
testimony of insanity as binding upon the trial judge's determination
of substantial evidence relative to a section 1368 hearing.' 8 If the
testimony of a clinical psychologist with only a masters degree, based
on a ten to twenty minute interview with the defendant, absent the
administering of any tests, meets the requirements of the substantial
evidence rule,8 9 then surely any testimony given by a Ph.D. in psy-
chology or an M.D. in psychiatry would also satisfy the rule.4°
Fourth, it is crucial to an understanding of the present California
law that an explanation of the substantial evidence test be ascertained.
More insight into the confusion of applying the Pennington rule is
supplied by People v. Laudermilk,41 decided by the California Su-
87 66 Adv. Cal. at 589, 426 P.2d at 949, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
38 See generally Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The
binding effect of medical testimony on the trial court was criticized by Judge Bazelon's
dissent:
The court properly rejects the view apparently held by some lawyers and
judges that hospital reports respecting competency are binding upon the
trial court. . . . As the majority recognizes, determination of competency...
requires not only clinical psychiatric judgement but, also a judgement based
upon a knowledge of criminal trial proceedings that is peculiarly within the
competence of the trial judge.
Id. at 820.
39 See material cited note 27 supra.
Mr. Sussman was a clinical psychologist with ten years experience. At the
time of the trial he did not have a doctorate in psychology. His testimony was
based on a ten to twenty minute interview with the defendant the morning of
the trial. No psychological tests were administered to defendant. Mr. Sussman
did mention that he had treated defendant some seven years before the trial
at Atuscadro State Hospital. 66 Adv. Cal. at 583, 426 P.2d at 945, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 377.
40 But cf. People v. Hoxie, 252 Adv. Cal. App. 967, 973, 984, 61 Cal. Rptr.
37, 40, 46 (1967).
Dr. Seymour Pollack, a psychiatrist, testified for the defendant. The doctor spent five
hours with the defendant; reviewed the medical history of the defendant, provided by
a psychiatrist who served at a mental institution where the defendant was a patient;
reviewed the reports of two other psychiatrists who testified at the trial; and reviewed
the statements of various witnesses.
Dr. Pollack testified that the defendant was insane at the time of the crime, and
that he "suspected Hoxie was feigning sanity at the trial." Id. (emphasis added).
One other psychiatrist testified that in his expert opinion, defendant was insane at
the time of the crime. Ten lay witnesses testified as to the defendant's insanity. The
two psychiatrists who testified for the prosecution concluded that the defendant was
medically but not legally insane. The court voiced the Pennington substantial evidence
test, and concluded that the evidence on behalf of the defendant was not "substantial."
41 67 Adv. Cal. 269, 431 P.2d 228, 61 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1967). Defendant was
convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. The only
evidence offered regarding the defendant's insanity was statements of defense counsel
in court.
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preme Court four months after Pennington.42 Attempting to explain
the substantial evidence test, the court stated that this test does not
offer "a simple formula applicable to all situations. ' 43 Later, the
court refers to some pre-Pennington cases to assist in "placing the
problem in perspective." 44 In the very next breath the court admits
that the reference to pre-Pennington cases is of limited practical
value, since they did not apply the test proscribed by Pennington5
The cases to which the Laudermilk court referred were classified
into two categories. The first category of cases was representative
of substantial evidence in the Pennington context. The second cate-
gory illustrated the lack of that substantial evidence. The primary
case used to illustrate satisfaction of the substantial evidence test
under the first category was People v. Aparicio,46 where the defen-
dant had been committed to a state mental institution several times.
Various staff psychiatrists from that institution testified on behalf of
the defendant; other witnesses testified that defendant was insane;
and the court noted evidence of irrational behavior at the trial.47
Oddly enough, the Laudermilk court does not mention that testimony
regarding defendant's insanity in Aparicio was uncontradicted testi-
mony in the Pate sense.48
The second category of cases reveals that more is needed to satisfy
the substantial evidence test than bizarre statements0 or actions,G
42 Pennington was decided April 27, 1967. Laudermilk was decided September 2,
1967.
4 67 Adv. Cal. at 280, 431 P.2d at 236, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
44 Id. at 281, 431 P.2d at 237, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
45 Id.
46 38 Cal. 2d 565, 241 P.2d 221 (1952).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 567-68, 241 P.2d at 223-24.
Three psychiatrists concluded that the defendant was legally sane at the time of the
crime, even though he was suffering from delusions, paranoia, and psychosis. Various
lay witnesses testified with regard to the defendant's irrational behavior. There was also
evidence of irrational behavior in court, but there was no contradictory testimony. As
a matter of fact, the prosecutor, having been acquainted with the defendant, suggested
a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The Laudermilk court also made reference to People v. West, 25 Cal. App. 369, 143
P. 793 (1914).
In West defendant was an inmate at Mendicino State Hospital for the insane when
he committed a homicide, while attempting to escape. Counsel for the defendant intro-
duced an affidavit of defendant's insanity stating that defendant had been committed
to the mental hospital from San Quentin upon the certification of the warden, resident
physician, and the captain of the yard. The affidavit also contained the contention of
defense counsel that defendant was insane. Furthermore, there was evidence of irrational
behavior at the trial. Id.
49 67 Adv. Cal. at 282, 431 P.2d at 237, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 653, citing People v.
Kroeger, 61 Cal. 2d 236, 243-44, 390 P.2d 369, 373, 37 Cal. Rptr. 593, 597 (1964)
(several hundred comments and outbursts by defendant in courtroom).
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or statements of defense counsel that the defendant is incapable of
cooperating in his defense,51 or psychiatric testimony that the defen-
dant is immature, dangerous, psychopathic, or homicidal or such
diagnosis with little reference to defendant's ability to assist in his
defense.
52
The Laudermilk court did not give even the slightest hint as to
what would satisfy the substantial evidence test when the evidence
presented is more than a bizarre statement but less than the over-
whelming quantity and quality of uncontradicted evidence noted in
Aparicio.
If the substantial evidence test is limited to the Laudermilk ex-
planation, it differs little from the pre-Pennington rule, that the de-
termination of a doubt is within the discretion of the trial judge.
53
It seems to be an inescapable conclusion that the Pennington sub-
stantial evidence test was used primarily as a vehicle to reverse
Pennington.' Having served its purpose, it becomes, in the light of
Laudermilk, a new label for an aged rule.
As a consequence of Pennington, it would now appear that if the
defendant offers substantial evidence of his present insanity during a
trial, there must ipso facto arise in the mind of the trial judge a
doubt as to the sanity of the defendant and a section 1368 hearing
must be ordered to determine the defendant's present mental status.
55
The decision to take that determination from the trial court may have
50 67 Adv. Cal. at 282, 431 P.2d at 237, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 653, citing People v.
Williams, 235 Cal. App. 2d 389, 398, 45 Cal. Rptr. 427, 433 (1965) (bizarre con-
versation with trial judge).
51 67 Adv. Cal. at 282, 431 P.2d at 237, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 653, citing People v.
Dailey, 175 Cal. App. 2d 101, 108-09, 345 P.2d 558, 562 (1959) (defense counsel
unable to get coherent statement from defendant regarding the crime).
52 67 Adv. Cal. at 282, 431 P.2d at 237, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 653, citing People v.
Jensen, 43 Cal. 2d 572, 579, 275 P.2d 25, 30 (1954) (statements that defendant had
a psychopathic personality; was immature; and was an extremely dangerous homicidal
type of individual).
53 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
54 See San Diego Union, Nov. 9, 1967, § A, at 1, 4. On retrial Pennington was found
presently sane. Subsequent to that finding, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Following the conclusion of the retrial, Imperial County District Attorney
James E. Hamilton made the following statement to the local superior court:
The [Pennington] opinion ... has convinced me beyond a doubt that the
Supreme Court of this state will go to any length, including the manufacturing
of facts, to reverse a case in which the death penalty has been imposed.
This is not the first time they have done this. I can only presume it will
not be the last.
See also Letter from Judge George R. Kirk to State of California Adult Authority,
Nov. 9, 1967, on file in the Law Review Office, University of San Diego School of Law.
55 66 Adv. Cal. at 589, 426 P.2d at 949, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
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merit."6 But unfortunately, in its present state the Pennington sub-
stantial evidence test offers no formula, simple or complex, applicable
to most situations. It would seem that further judicial or legislative
clarification is in order.
RONALD L. FEIN
56 See People v. Vester, 135 Cal. App. 223, 26 P.2d 685 (1933), where the court
stated:
As it may affect personal privileges, favors, or acts of grace whicl may be
extended by a court to a person who already has been convicted of the com-
mission of a criminal offense, it is readily perceivable how legal discretion may
affect the positive and affirmative rights of persons ... merely accused of the
commission of crimes, it is difficult, if possible, to admit its appropriate ap-
plicability; or if attempted to be and actually exercised, to recognize its binding
force or its legal conclusiveness.
Id. at 224-26, 26 P.2d at 686.
